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The series of means and ends either stretches out indefinitely, or it must terminate in some desired object or objects which are ends in themselves.Again we sometimes call a thing good because it possesses completely, or in a high degree, the perfections proper to its nature, as a good painting, good respiration.The theory leans, therefore, to dualism, and its influence may be traced through the early Gnostic and Manichaean heresies, and, in a minor degree, in the doctrines of the Priscillanists and Albigenses.Aristotle Starting from the Platonic definition, good is that which all desire, Aristotle, rejecting the Platonic doctrine of a transcendent world of ideas, holds that the good and being are identical; good is not something added to being, it is being.Now, among ideas the noblest and highest is the idea good: it is the supreme and sovereign idea.Whatever things possess goodness have it only because they participate in or draw from, the Sovereign Good.Plato According to Plato, in the objective order corresponding to our thought, there are two different worlds: the world of things, and the incomparably higher, nobler world of ideas, which transcends the world of things.The objects corresponding directly to our universal concepts are not things, but ideas.
This view leads to the inference that the origin of evil lies beyond the control of God.
The objective idea is not indwelling in the essences of those things which fall within the scope of our corresponding universal concept, but the thing borrows or derives something from the idea.
While the being or existence proper to the world of things is imperfect, unstable, essentially transitory, and therefore not truly deserving of the name of being, whcih implies permanence, ideas on the contrary are incorruptible, unchangeable, and truly existence.
Everything that is, is good because it is; the quantity, if one may use the word loosely, of being or existence which a thing possesses, is at the same time the stock of goodness.
A diminution or an increase of its being is a diminution or increase of its goodness.